Case I: Tudor Fashions
Tudor Fashions is a four-decade old company. Its two major product lines are footwear and ready-to-wear garments. It was nearly 10 am and the company CEO, Prashant Gupta, decided to take a walk in the Connaught Place area to observe people in general and office goers in particular, before going to his office on Barakhamba Road. His idea was to have a first-hand feeling of consumer response to the Tudor shoes and observe in general the footwear habit of urban Indians. He parked his car and walked purposefully.
Tudor shoes were positioned as simple, no fuss yet elegant shoes particularly targeted at office goers. The shoes had a reputation of being comfortable and reasonably priced and had a good market share despite competition from Bata, Windsor, Lee Cooper, Woodland and Liberty etc.
Prashant looked keenly at the moving feet of hurrying office goers. His trained eyes could notice the changing scenario. A significantly large number of office goers no longer seemed to have any preference for “no fuss” shoes. There was a very distinct shift in preference for heavy looking bold shoes. Consumers’ perceptions about the type of shoes appropriate for wearing to office were changing from regular six-hole laced shoes to these heavy looking bold shoes. As a result of this shift in consumer perceptions and preferences, the market share of Tundor shoes had declined by 10 percent within the last two years.
The trend was disturbing, and Prashant called a meeting of departmental heads. The outcome of the meeting was an agreement by all that perceptions, attitudes and preferences of Indian urban consumers had undergone a significant change about the workplace and products. No longer did they perceive the workplace as dull and boring where a “no nonsense and stiff upper lip” attitude has to be maintained. The office was viewed more as a part of everyday life where one can be reasonably relaxed and within limits, “you can be yourself” attitude was OK. A major decision was taken that Tudor shoes should shed off its image of being “traditional,” and keeping pace with times should become “contemporary”, as more and more consumers were going for branded shoes.
Departmental heads agreed that consumers carry a definite “Price- quality” perception about most branded products, including shoes. High price is generally perceived as denoting high quality. To take advantage of such consumer perceptions, it was decided to move away from “high quality- affordable price” and targeting the growing middle class consumers to a “high price- high quality” image. The decision-makers saw better prospects for the company by making such a move. In larger cities especially, shoes were no longer viewed a necessity but had become a part of fashion accessory and life style expression.
For the past nearly four decades, Tudor Fashions was known for making popular and affordable shoes. After the decision, the company took a one hundred and eighty degree turn. It developed dedicated showroom with premium priced shoes and other accessories such as leather bags, belts, purses, and T-shirts etc.
The results were quite contrary to expectations and the decrease in market share continued despite the new efforts. Apparently, the reasons for such results seem to be quite simple – for decades, consumers carried the image of Tudor shoes as good quality in the affordable range. This created considerable confusion among consumers and they felt betrayed. They turned to other brands, national as well as local. The main appeal for the consumer was missing. The premium brands were perceived to be in a category that catered to upper middle and upper class consumers. When consumers considered premium shoes, other brands came to recall, not tudor.
QUESTIONS
1. What kind of information was the basis for the CEO’s decision about Tudor shoes?
2. Analyse the pros and cons of Prashant’s decision about Tudor shoes.
3. Suggest an approach which in your view might have been successful in changing consumer perceptions and attitudes about Tudor shoes.
4. You are a marketing communications consultant. Suggest an ad campaign to help Tudor establish a premium image for its shoes.
Case II : Burnol
Do marketers have the freedom to reposition a brand? Or can a brand develop a life of its own in the consumer’s mind- and grow so strong as to become intractable?
Burnol is available in a yellow tube. This burns-relief ointment has been around for six decades- long enough to become generic to the usage category.
Originally, the yellow ointment was a breakthrough idea, at least partly because it resembled turmeric paste, the traditional household burns-relief application in India.
Recently, the brand was acquired by Morepen, which is a fully owned subsidiary of Morepen Laboratories Ltd., from Reckitt Piramal. It is not often that one of India’s strongest brands changes hands (In its February 2002 issue A&M reported Burnol occupying 34th rank in India’s Top Brands). According to Sushil Suri, chairman and managing director, Morepen Laboratories Ltd., Burnol has a recall of over 90% in India, even amongst below-25s.
The other facts worth mentioning, however, are that Morepen is the brand’s third owner, and the brand was sold for just 8.95 crore. For a brand of its strength, it smells suspiciously like a distress sale. Observers are not surprised. The market for such ointments has been stagnant for years. Revival teams have even tried to widen the brand’s usage to secure growth, but in vain. Some analysts place Burnol way beyond the ‘maturity stage’ of its life cycle. Yet, Morepen feels that the brand holds potential. Could it be right?
This is the story of a brand that simply refuses to budge from the ‘burns’ spot in consumers’ mind space. Nonetheless, the brand must still find new growth avenues.
Burnol was first launched around 60 years ago as a cream to soothe and heal skin burns by Boots Pure Drug Co (India) Private Ltd. Boots was importing it from its parent in the U.K. Domestic manufacture started in 1948. With J. Walter Thompson as he advertising agency. It was launched at about a rupee per 25 gm pack, and was available only on doctor’s prescription. It was only in 1960 that Burnol began being sold as OTC, when Boots began expanding its distribution network.
By the mid 1960s, Burnol had become an integral part of the Indian housewife’s life, as much of it revolved around either wood-fed or kerosene cooking stoves. The first attempt to broaden its appeal was made in 1967, when Boots started highlighting the fact that its active ingredients served just as well as any other antiseptic for cuts and other wounds. It didn’t work, so Boots contended itself with selling a burns ointment, a market in which it had monopoly.
In 1972 came competition when SK&F launched Shield, a rival cream. It was followed by Mediguard from J.L. Morison. Burnol saw them both off. By 1974, Burnol was being advertised on Doordarshan, India’s first TV station, with a commercial showing a mother using Burnol on the arm of her daughter who springs on her mother in the kitchen and gets splashed with hot oil. The voiceover, “Haath jal gaya? Shukar hai ghar mein Burnol jo bai,” (hand got burnt? Thankfully, there is Burnal at home). The brand burrowed its way deep into the Indian house-care consciousness.
The 1980s saw a decline in the dangers of kitchen cooking, as most middle-class homes switched to LPG stoves, which had controlled flames. Electric spark lighters also started replacing matchboxes, making it safer still. Almost on cue, Burnol sales started stagnating.
Boots resorted to measures such as advertising on the back of matchboxes and wall paintings in rural areas. But still, it was no help. In 1987-1988, it hired IMRB to conduct a product usage and as awareness study. The results indicated that for 98% of respondents the spontaneous solution to any burn was Burnol, but only 60% said they had the product, a figure that fell to 20% when IMRB conducted actual checks. The brand had a strong presence in the mind, but was not in widespread use. By now, public awareness campaigns were urging people to use plain water to treat burns. Burnol's turmeric was also becoming a liability, since it was seen to stain clothes. So Boots changed the cream from deep to non-staining light yellow, and re-launched it in tubes of 12 gm (Rs. 4.50) and 30 gm (Rs. 7.80). The new ad campaign urged people to keep the product in easy reach. The result: a short-lived blip in sales. Sales stayed at around 5.4 million tubes (plus around 30% more at non-chemist outlets).
By 1990s, Burnol's sales were crawling along in low single digits. To get larger volumes, Boots again decided to try repositioning Burnol as a wide-appeal, multiple usage antiseptic. The brand was re-launched as Antiseptic Burnol 3-in-1. Its colour was made even lighter, dissociating it with turmeric, and was given a new perfume. The product hit the shelves in 1994, with a campaign showing neighbours raising their eyebrows at Burnol being 'misused' on a non-burn wound. But alas, the brand couldn't dent the established brand equity of other OTC antiseptic creams, such Boroline and Dettol. What's more, its share of voice (SOV) in the mid 1990s was far less than it had been in the pre-liberalisation era- which meant that the new message was simply drowned out. In other words, in the average consumer's mind, the brand remained where it had always been- in 'burns' spot firmly anchored. The name was such. Ironically, its very strength of (strong generic branding) had trapped it into a stagnant market.
Frustrated, in July 1997, Boots sold Burnol to Reckitt Piramal, a joint venture (JV) for OTC product between Reckitt Benckister and Nicholas Piramal, for Rs. 12.5 crore. The new owner named it, Burnol Plus, and repositioned it as a 'First Aid Cream', as was printed on the pack. With HTA as the ad agency, Reckitt Piramal went for an ad blitz, which helped it gain power on A&M's chart of Top Brands for 1999. This happened after years of steady decline. In calendar year 2000, Burnol registered a turnover of 6.2 crore. Before this increase in figure, however, the Reckitt Piramal JV came apart-leaving Burnol 'orphaned'. It was unavailable for almost half of 2001- till Dr. Morepen decided to buy it. The deal was sealed in late 2001.
Dr. Morepen is realistic about Burnol's association with burns; even if it is a major handicap in a market where the old needs is fast passing into history. The 'burns' market is placed at 39 crore, including hospital dressings, which is much less than the antiseptic market of Rs. 210 crore.
Morepen is convinced that jumping from a well-defined application to a crowded market, as a me-too, was a disastrous idea, for it left the brand as neither this nor that. The better way would be to retain the brand's essential uniqueness, but stretch the original application as wide as possible without diluting the core brand values.
Questions
1. Analyse the case and identify the significant issues.
2. What is the level of consumer involvement in such a product category?
3. What strategies would you recommend to change consumer attitude towards the brand?
4. Why have attempts to reposition the brand failed? Has it anything to do with consumer attitudes or appropriateness of communication messages?
Case III: Consumer Insight - Tattoos and Extended Self
Most products and services associated with extended self are physically separated from the physical self. Until recently, exceptions were limited primarily to hairstyles and colouring, and cosmetics. One could also alter the physical self through exercise, diet, weight training and plastic surgery. In recent years, body piercing and tattooing have become additional ways to alter both the extended self and the physical self. Tattooing is unique (except for plastic surgery) in that it is a relatively unalterable change to physical self. It can be done primarily for adomment or beauty enhancement reasons. Or, it can serve primarily as public or private symbol.
For most of this century, tattooing was not socially acceptable among most social groups in the United States. The most noticeable exception was enlisted men in the Navy, and even then alcohol consumption was frequently involved in the decision to secure a tattoo. This has changed sharply in the recent years. Why has this become socially acceptable and what does it mean to the self-concept of those who secure tattoos? Research on tattoos focuses on four themes- the renaissance of tattooing, the impact of the tattoo on the extended self, the risks associated with acquiring a tattoo, and the satisfaction/ dissatisfaction that can result.
A tattoo renaissance began in the 1960s with the hippie movement and the evolution of skilled tattoo artists in the San Francisco area. Interest also began to grow in the historical and ethnographic aspects of the tattoo medium. The commercial art world and academic art historians began to pay attention t tattooing as an art form. This, in turn, attracted better tattoo artists. By the early 1990s, public figures, particularly arthletes, began to wear visible tattoos, which increased their acceptability among the more venturesome members of “mainstream” society. Tattoos have meanings on at least three levels. First, there is the meaning associated with having a tattoo. While increasingly common, having a tattoo is still far from the norm. Thus, having a tattoo in and of itself makes a statement about the person. A person with a tattoo is still viewed as somewhat of a risk taker or non-conformist. The location of the tattoo also contains meaning. The more visible the tattoo, the more rebellious or non-conforming the individual appears to be. The tattoo itself is a major source of meaning, both private and symbolic. Tattoos may symbolize group membership, interests, activities, relationships, life transitions, or values. Tattoos may symbolize group membership, interests, activities, relationships, life transitions, or values. Tattoos may be unique and filled primarily with personal meaning or their meaning may be rooted in cultural practice and myths.
Acquiring a tattoo is risky. It is very expensive to remove or alter a tattoo. Thus, if you don’t like your tattoo or your tastes change over time, you are at a financial risk. There is also the social risk that one’s current or future friends, colleagues, or employers will have a negative reaction to the tattoo. Finally, there is still physiological risk associated with acquiring a tattoo.
Ultimately, there is evaluation and satisfaction or dissatisfaction. As mentioned earlier, dissatisfaction is difficult and expensive to correct. Satisfaction, often at a high level, is a frequent outcome. Some research indictes that this may even produce addiction.
(Source : Advances in Consumer Research, ed.J.W. Alba and J.W. Hutchinson, 1998).
(Author’s note : Tattooing has been in India for the last several decades. Rural people visiting melas were often keen to get their names tattooed on their forearms. Womenfolk were more interested in getting some design or flowers tattooed. Probably, they did not have such complex psychological reasons as the research in United States shows. In acquiring a tattoo, the new generation youth may be having complex psychological reasons as reported in the study).
Questions :
1. What is the significance of acquiring a tattoo in India? Are tattoos considered a way of making a personality statement?
2. Contact two educated persons who wear a tattoo (not just the name). Interview them to find out what does it mean to them?
3. Interview three of your friends. Find out about their self-concept and what kind of tattoo would they like to have.
Case IV: Golden Glow Soap
Anil Mahajan absent -mindedly ran his finger over the cake of soap before him. He traced the name 'Golden Glow' embossed on the soap as he inhaled its unmistakable sesame fragrance. It was a small soap, almost like a bar of gold. There were no frills, no coloured packaging, and no fancy shape. Just a golden glow and the fragrance of sesame and Lucida font that quietly stated' Golden Glow'.
Mahajan smiled wanly and clasped the soap in his hands, as if protecting it from an unseen predator. He was wondering with quiet concern if the 30-year-old brand would last long. Sensi India, where Mahajan was marketing manager, was taking a long, hard look at the soap, as it was proving to be a strain on resources.
There were varying stories about how Golden Glow was launched. Some said the brand was a 'gift' from the departing English parent company. Others claimed that it was created for the then chairman's British wife, as the Indian climate did not agree with her skin. They also claimed that the lady also coined the copy "The honest soap that loves your skin" was also coined by the lady. The line had stuck through three decades. Only the visuals had changed, with newer models replacing the older ones.
Zeni was basically a speciality products company producing household hygiene, fabricare, and dental care products. Golden Glow was the only soap in its product mix, produced and marketed by Sensi. Its reliable quality and value delivery had earned it a lot of respect in the market. Golden Glow equity was such that Sensi was known as the Golden Glow Company. Indeed, the brand name Golden Glow denoted purity, reliability, and gentle skincare.
In 1994, Sensi UK increased its stake in the Indian subsidiary to 51%. Within months, all of Sensi's products were given a facelift, thanks to the inflow of foreign capital. New packaging, new fragrances, new formulations and more variants were introduced.
Only Golden Glow was left untouched. For, although it had a growing skincare business following some strategic acquisitions in Europe in the early eighties, Sensi UK was not a soap company. The UK marketing team ran an audit of every brand and product in the company's portfolio. But when it came to Golden Glow, it faltered. "We don't know this one," officials at the parent company said.
"We don't want this one to be touched," Mahajan had said protectively, a sentiment tliat was endorsed by the managing director, Rajan Sharma. "Golden Glow is too sacred, we will leave it as it is," he said.
But the UK marketing team was confounded. What was a lone soap doing in the midst of toilet cleaners and fabric protectors; they wondered, however they somehow agreed that their proposed revamp strategy would only look at up-gradation, not tinkering with what wasn't broken.
Indeed, for 30 long years no one had tampered with the Golden Glow brand. And Mahajan felt there was no reason to start now. Golden Glow, in his view, was a self-sustaining brand. That was a bit of an understatement because advertising for the brand was moderate and Sensi India had never used any promotional gimmick for it.
Now, after four years of nurturing the other categories, Sensi UK had decided to launch its Vio range of skincare products in India. But Golden Glow's presence and profile was a major roadblock to Vio's success. "It will create dissonance, confuse our skincare equity and deter the articulation of Vio's credo. It will stand out as a genetic flaw," argued the UK marketing head. "You need to do a rethink on Golden Glow."
Mahajan protested. "Why? It has such a strong equity and loyal following. So much has been invested in it all these years. Why give up all that?"
Rajan, however, had another idea. "Let us then extend the Golden Glow brand." He said It was the simplest solution. Companies were now investing heavily in creating new equities for their brands. But in Golden Glow's case, Sensi was already sitting on a brand with a terrific equity. He felt that extending this equity to other categories, such as skincare products would be successful.
But Golden Glow needed a new positioning before it could be extended. Till a few years ago, it had been in premium category, priced at Rs.15. Then new brands with specific positioning and higher price tags entered the market. This created a level above Rs.15 soaps and pushed Golden Glow down to the mid-priced range. So Golden Glow's price was not commensurate with its premium position and image.
Over the years, Golden Glow had become so sacred that Sensi India had been too scared to do anything to it. As a result, the soap was left with niche category of loyal users. This category neither shrank or increased, just kept getting older and older, and with it the brand also kept growing older. For example, when Mahajan's wife had her first baby at 25, her mother had recommended Golden Glow for her dry skin and also for baby's tender skin because it contained sesame oil. That was in 1979. Today, Mahajan's daughter had turned 21 and was being wooed by Dove, Camay, even Santoor, and Lifebuoy Gold, with their aggressive advertising. Golden Glow had begun to lose its image of being contemporary as newer brands came in with newer values.
Today, at 46, Mahajan's wife still used Golden Glow, but when she recommended Golden Glow to her daughter, she said, "But Golden Glow is a soap for mothers, for older people."
That was a major problem. The Golden Glow brand had aged, and Sensi India hadn't even been aware of it. While its equity had grown with its users, its personality had aged considerably in the last 30 years. "I don't think you can keep the personality young, unless you keep renewing the brand. The objective now is to widen your equity so that your image becomes young," continued Rajan. "For instance, if today you were to personify a Golden Glow user now, it would be a woman of 45 years using the same brand for many years, who is aver-se to experimenting, very skincare conscious, very trusting, and very one-dimensional. As you can see, this is not a very competitive personality. These are the strengths of our Golden Glow, but these are also its weaknesses," he analysed.
The context had changed. Today, youth demanded brands that stood for freedom and fearlessness. They demanded bold brands that dared to cure, not just p;eserve. "Preservation is for old people. Those are the attributes being presented in evolved markets," said Rajan. To make Golden Glow contemporary, the attributes had to be re-framed, he felt. "You can't make a young brand trusting caring, loving, without adding other attributes to it. Today, youth stands for freedom, for laughter, for frankness, for forthrightness. That's what Close Up, Lifebuoy Gold, Vatika, and other brands propagate. So, either come clean and say it is for older skin which needs trust and kindness, or reposition the brand," said Rajan.
Repositioning was also necessary to address another anomaly in Golden Glow's image: its perceived premium. Sensi India had been unable to do anything about Golden Glow slipping into the mid-price range following the entry of more expensive brands. Now, as Rajan mulled over the brand extension plan, Mahajan felt that Golden Glow's premium positioning was its core equity and that had to be maintained.
"If you are premium priced in the consumer's mind, your extensions are automatically perceived as premium. So, if you don't present the other products as premium, the consumer will not see them as extensions of the brand," he said. "For example, if you are to launch a shampoo which is priced lower than Sunsilk, but higher than Nyle and Ayur, then whatever the rationale, the consumer will not accept your product. "It is not the Golden Glow I know," will be the feeling," he said.
Mahajan felt that since premium positioning was one of Golden Glow's equity values, it would be very difficult to convince consumers that the brand was being extended without hanging on to this particular value. "Will they buy your rationale that the very same values and equity would now be available at a low price? To be in the premium segment now, you have to price it at Rs 35 or 40, almost on a par with Dove," he said. "With Dove retailing at Rs 45, Golden Glow will be perceived as a cheaper option."
"We can't simply raise the price," said Rajan. "What are we offering for that increase? You can 't add value because you don't want to tamper with the brand. The consumers will then ask, "Golden Glow used to be so cheap, what has happened now? The user will forget that 15 years ago, Rsl0 was expensive, because all her comparisons would be in today' s context," said Rajan.
"So what's the option?" asked Mahajan. "You don't have to be expensive to be premium," said Rajan. Golden Glow already has the image of a premium brand, thanks to its time-tested core values of purity, credibility, and reliability. What we can do is reinforce the premium through communication and positioning. In fact) we should have tinkered with Golden Glow long ago. That is what HLL did with Lux. It also launched a bridge brand, Lux International, in the premium category," said Rajan.
"How could we have done anything to the brand?" asked Mahajan. "The product had such a strong following. It stood for gold, for sesame oil, for its subtle earthy perfume. We changed the packaging periodically, but that's all we could do. Remember the time we brought out a transparent green Golden Glow with the fragrance of lime? It bombed in the market."
Rajan was not in favour of the premium positioning. It appeared very short sighted to him, given the bigger plan to extend the brand. "Where are the volumes in the premium segment? He asked. "For some reason, every manufacturer feels that skincare can be an indulgence of only the moneyed class. As a result, there is a crowd in the premium end of the market. Do we want to be yet another player in the segment?"
Fifteen years ago, Golden Glow was perceived as a premium product. But today, globa1brands like Revlon, Coty, and Oriflame were delivering specific premium platforms. Golden Glow did not have a global equity. 'Let us revisit the brand and examine what it stood for 15 years ago and examine the relevance of those attributes in today's context," suggested Rajan. "Golden Glow stood for care, consciousness, love, quality and all that. But today, are these enough to justify a premium position?" he asked Mahajan. "These attributes are viable in the mid-priced segment." He said.
"The mid-priced brand is the proverbial washer-man's dog," said Mahajan. "You don't know whether you are at the bottom end of the premium range or at the top-end of the low-priced range. You end up creating an image of being on the opportunity fence. It is a mere pricing ploy, with no strategic value."
QUESTIONS
1. Discuss the nature of problem(s) in this case?
2. Suggest the kind of consumer research needed?
3. How should Golden Glow be positioned/ repositioned to bring about the desired change among consumers? Give your reasons.
CASE V: Impact of Retail Promotions on Consumers
Shoppers' Delight, a large retail store, had above-average quality and competitive prices. It advertised its retail promotions in local newspapers. Its TV advertising was mainly aimed at building store image and did not address retail promotions. The management knew it well that they had to advertise their retail promotions more, but they did not feel comfortable with the effectiveness of present efforts and wanted to better understand the impact of their present promotions.
To better understand the effectiveness of present efforts, a study of advertising exposure, interpretation, and purchases was undertaken. Researchers conducted 50 in-depth interviews with customers of the store's target market to determine the appropriate product mix, price, ad copy and media for the test. In addition, the store's image and that of its two competitors were measured.
Based on the research findings, different product lines that would appeal to the target customers were selected. The retail promotion was run for a full week. Full-page advertisements were released each day in the two local Hindi newspapers, and also in one English newspaper that devotes six pages to the coverage of the state.
Each evening, a sample of 100 target market customers were interviewed by telephone as follows:
1. Target customers were asked if they had read the newspaper that day. This was done to determine their exposure to advertisement.
2. After a general description of the product lines, the respondents were asked to recall any related retail advertisements they had seen or read.
3, If the respondents were able to recall, they were asked to describe the ad, the promoted products, sale prices, and the name of the sponsoring store.
4. If the respondents were accurate in their ad interpretation, they were asked to express their intentions to purchase.
5. Respondents were also asked for suggestions to be incorporated in future promotions targeted at this consumer segment.
Immediately after the close of promotion, 500 target market customers were surveyed to determine what percentage of the target market actually purchased the promoted products. It also determined which sources of information influenced them in their decision to purchase and the amount of their purchase.
Results of the study showed that ad exposure was 75 per cent and ad awareness level was 68 per cent and was considered as high. Only 43 percent respondents exposed to and aware of the ad copy could accurately recall important details, such as the name of the store promoting the retail sale. Just 43 per cent correct interpretation was considered as low. Of those who could accurately interpret the ad copy, 32 per cent said they intended to respond by purchasing the advertised• products ' and 68per cent sad they had no intention to buy. This yields an overall intention to buy of 7 per cent. The largest area of lost opportunity was due to those who did not accurately interpret the ad copy. The post-promotion survey indicated that only 4.2 per cent of the target market customers made purchases of the promoted products during the promotion period. In terms of how the buyers learned of the promotion, 46 per cent mentioned newspaper A (Hindi), 27 per cent newspaper B (Hindi), 8 per cent newspaper (English), and 15 per cent learned about sale through word-of mouth communication.
The retail promotion was judged as successful in many ways, besides yielding sales worth Rs 900,000. However, management was concerned about not achieving a higher level of ad comprehension, missing a significant sales opportunity: It was believed that a better ad would have at least 75 per cent correct comprehension among those aware of the ad. This in turn would almost double sales without any additional cost.
QUESTIONS
1. Why would some consumers have high-involvement levels in learning about this sales promotion?
2 Is a level of 75 per cent comprehension realistic among those who become aware of an ad? Why or why not?
3. Do you think such promotions are likely to influence the quality image of the retail store? Explain.
No comments:
Post a Comment